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Abstract—Standardization of Post-Quantum Cryptography
(PQC) was started by NIST in 2016 and has proceeded to its
second elimination round. The upcoming standards are intended
to replace (or supplement) current RSA and Elliptic Curve
Cryptography (ECC) on all targets, including lightweight, em-
bedded, and mobile systems. We present an energy requirement
analysis based on extensive measurements of PQC candidate
algorithms on a Cortex M4 - based reference platform. We relate
computational (energy) costs of PQC algorithms to their data
transmission costs which are expected to increase with new types
of public keys and ciphertext messages. The energy, bandwidth,
and latency needs of PQC algorithms span several orders of
magnitude, which is substantial enough to impact battery life,
user experience, and application protocol design. We propose
metrics and guidelines for PQC algorithm usage in IoT and
mobile systems based on our findings. Our evidence supports the
view that fast structured-lattice PQC schemes are the preferred
choice for cloud-connected mobile devices in most use cases, even
when per-bit data transmission energy cost is relatively high.
Index Terms—Post-Quantum Cryptography, Energy Effi-
ciency, Cortex M4, Mobile Cloud
I. INTRODUCTION
Vulnerability of factoring-based and (elliptic curve) discrete
logarithm cryptography (RSA, DL, ECDL, ECC) to quantum
computing has been known since Shor published his cele-
brated algorithm in 1994 [1]. The following 25 years have
seen several breakthroughs and a steady improvement in the
capabilities of quantum computers – but also the emergence
and maturing of the field of Post-Quantum Cryptography
(PQC) which studies public-key algorithms that are resistant to
attacks by quantum computers in addition to classical threats.
The first dedicated PQCrypto workshop in 2006 already
featured talks about lattice-based, hash-based, code-based, and
multivariate cryptography [2]. These remain the major groups
of post-quantum algorithms 14 years later, with the addition
of the isogeny problem of supersingular curves [3], [4].
As quantum-safe “drop-in replacements” to RSA and ECC,
post-quantum cryptography does not have the practical limita-
tions of Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) and other solutions
that do not support the public-key model and impose strict
physical requirements on the transmission channel [5].
As shown in this work, established PQC proposals include
public-key encryption and signature algorithms that require
This work was supported by Innovate UK (R&D Project Ref. 104423.)
less computational resources than RSA or ECC and are there-
fore suitable replacements in handheld devices, smart cards,
and Internet-of-Things (IoT) applications. There are also PQC
proposals that are are prohibitively “heavy” for any of these
targets, so understanding the individual characteristics of each
algorithm is necessary for system design.
A. Post-Quantum Standardization and Transition
In August 2015 the U.S. Committee for National Secu-
rity Systems (CNSS) and National Security Agency (NSA)
announced “plans for transitioning to quantum-resistant algo-
rithms” in National Security Systems (NSS), i.e. all govern-
mental systems that handle classified information [6], [7].
Standardization bodies such as ETSI (European Telecom-
munications Standards Institute) had already initiated studies
of quantum-safe cryptography with the view on standardizing
it [8], but the 2015 CNSS/NSA post-quantum transition an-
nouncement created an immediate requirement for U.S. NIST
(National Institute for Standards and Technology) to start a
competitive standardization effort for U.S. Government use.
NIST has studied quantum-resistant cryptography at least
since 2009 [9]. The current NIST PQC project is widely
seen as a successor to previous, highly influential standard-
selection competitions that led to the development of AES
(Advanced Encryption Standard project, 1997–2001 [10]) and
SHA-3 (Secure Hash Algorithm project, 2007–2012 [11]).
The NIST PQC algorithm requirements were released in late
2016 and initial submissions were due 30 November 2017,
with 69 proposals entering the competition. In two years the
effort has proceeded to its second selection round with 26
proposals remaining, out of which 17 are for encryption and
key encapsulation (KEM) and 9 are intended for signatures
[3], [12]. Table I lists current candidates along with their
rough classification and also whether or not they had suitable
lightweight implementations for this study (“PQPS”).
The NIST PQC project will go through a third elimination
round in 2020/2021, but we already can have a fair under-
standing of the relative computational and communication
requirements of the future standards – it is expected that
more than one of the current candidates will be standardized
and these algorithms will gradually replace RSA and ECC in
applications. Previous experience indicates that such algorithm
transitions typically take at least a decade to complete.
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TABLE I
SECOND ROUND NIST PQC CANDIDATE ALGORITHMS.
Name Type Family Problem PQPS
BIKE KEM Codes QC-MDPC –
Classic McEliece KEM Codes Goppa –
DILITHIUM Sign Lattice Fiat-Shamir X
Falcon Sign Lattice Hash&Sign X
FrodoKEM KEM Lattice LWE X
GeMSS Sign Multivar. HFE –
HQC KEM Codes QCSD –
KYBER KEM Lattice MLWE X
LAC KEM Lattice RLWE X
LEDAcrypt KEM Codes QC-LDPC –
LUOV Sign Multivar UOV –
MQDSS Sign Multivar. Fiat-Shamir –
NewHope KEM Lattice RLWE X
NTRU KEM Lattice NTRU X
NTRU Prime KEM Lattice NTRU –
NTS-KEM KEM Codes Goppa –
Picnic Sign Symmetric ZKP –
qTESLA Sign Lattice Fiat-Shamir –
Rainbow Sign Multivar. UOV –
ROLLO KEM Codes Low Rank –
Round5 KEM Lattice LWR/RLWR X
RQC KEM Codes Low Rank –
SABER KEM Lattice MLWR X
SIKE KEM Isogeny Supersingular X
SPHINCS+ Sign Symmetric Hash –
Three Bears KEM Lattice IMLWE X
B. NIST: PQC Key Establishment and Signatures Only
The 2016 NIST call for candidate algorithms [13] limited
the competition to three types of public-key primitives: Key
Encapsulation Mechanisms (KEMs), public key encryption
algorithms, and digital signature algorithms. KEMs and public
key encryption algorithms can be trivially converted into each
other – KEM was originally proposed as a “better way of
doing public-key encryption” [14]. KEMs can also be used
for (ephemeral) key exchange and key establishment, although
they may lack commutative and contributory properties of
Diffie-Hellman required by some protocols [15].
NIST defines five security levels for post-quantum algo-
rithms; these correspond to best classical and quantum attacks
that can be mounted against AES-128 (L1), SHA-256 (L2),
AES-192 (L3), SHA-384 (L4), and AES-256 (L5). The best
classical attacks against AES and SHA are traditional brute-
force and birthday attacks so L1/L2 has 128-bit, L3/L4 has
192-bit, and L5 has 256-bit classical security (in addition to
being quantum-secure). The quantum security of L1, L3, and
L5 is determined via Grover’s [16] algorithm. For Levels L2
and L4 quantum collision attacks [17] can be used.
We observe that the external functionality provided by NIST
PQC algorithms closely matches NIST’s current RSA and
ECC-based public-key standards, namely SP 800-56 [18],
[19] for key establishment and FIPS 180-4 [20] for digital
signatures. A far wider spectrum of quantum-secure schemes
exists; especially hard lattice problems allows construction of
virtually any type of scheme, from Identity- and Attribute-
based Encryption (IBE and ABE) to Fully Homomorphic
Encryption (FHE) [21].
C. Hybrid and Dual PQC Schemes
Conservative early adopters of PQC cryptography may
first adopt a hybrid (dual, composite) approach to both key
establishment and digital signatures. In such a scheme a
PQC primitive is coupled with a conventional public-key
algorithm for additional security assurance or interim FIPS 140
compliance before NIST PQC algorithms are fully approved.1
Newly designed systems will probably skip the hybrid
stage as it effectively doubles the engineering effort and
has a severe negative impact on computational overhead –
with conventional public-key cryptography often being the
performance bottleneck. The main hybrid approaches are:
1) Hybrid Key Establishment: It is possible to design a
hybrid key establishment method that uses a PQC algorithm
in conjunction with a conventional method such as ECDH
(Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman) in such a way that both
algorithms (or the key derivation function that combines them)
need to be attacked in order to compromise the overall scheme.
2) Dual Signatures: A dual signature consists of two (or
more) signatures. The signatures can be generated by two
different algorithms using two secret keys. The dual signature
is considered valid only if both of its signatures are valid.
It is possible to store a secondary (post-quantum) signature
in a non-critical X.509 extension in a way that allows com-
patibility with existing Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) [22].
Current IETF efforts are directed towards “composite” dual
certificates that do not use non-critical extensions [23].
D. Transport Layer Security (TLS)
Communication security and authentication mechanisms in
IoT systems are currently largely based on lightweight TLS
[24] stacks running on top of application protocols such as
MQTT [25], [26]. Transition is still ongoing towards TLS
protocol version 1.3 which was released in 2018.
Post-quantum transition only affects the asymmetric com-
ponents of TLS 1.3; its symmetric authenticated encryption
(AEAD) and key derivation components (cipher suites) read-
ily support post-quantum levels from L1 to L5. New PQC
algorithms are only used for key exchange and endpoint
authentication, not for the transmission of bulk data streams.
TLS is a flexible, extensible protocol that negotiates the
symmetric cipher suites, supported key establishment methods
(“groups”), and authentication signature algorithms as part of
its client-server handshake. New public-key algorithms can
be fairly easily incorporated in the framework. Ad hoc post-
quantum TLS implementations have existed at least since
2015 [27]. The Open Quantum Safe2 project provides a free
OpenSSL variant with support for a large subset of NIST
algorithms [28]. In these implementations a NIST PQC KEM
is used for key exchange and authentication is performed with
a NIST PQC signature algorithm and certificates [29].
1Dustin Moody (NIST), “Revising FAQ questions on hybrid modes”,
October 30, 2019. https://groups.google.com/a/list.nist.gov/d/msg/pqc-forum/
qRP63ucWIgs/rY5Sr 52AAAJ
2Open Quantum Safe Project: https://openquantumsafe.org/
E. The Cloud: Large-Scale PQC Experiments
The large-scale post-quantum cloud experiments ran by
Amazon [30], Google [31], and Cloudflare [32] have focused
on ephemeral hybrid key exchange methods in TLS (Bor-
ingSSL and S2N implementations). Algorithm selection in
these experiments was limited to only one or two candidates,
and focus was on networking performance; how the commu-
nication infrastructure copes with the changes introduced by
the post-quantum transition.
Cloudflare and Google used NTRU variant HRSS-SXY
[33], which has a relatively slow key generation phase and
is therefore not ideally suited for ephemeral key exchange
(potential key caching improves latency but not energy profile).
They also experimented with isogeny-based proposal SIKE
[34], which has the shortest messages but is computationally
very expensive (slow). Google saw this experiment primarily
as a comparison between isogeny-based systems and (struc-
tured) lattice schemes and tried to pick an “average” algorithm
from the latter set. Google and Cloudflare consider HRSS as
a more promising algorithm for TLS than SIKE [31], [32].
The Amazon system [30] currently supports SIKE [34]
and BIKE [35] algorithms. Since both of these schemes are
relatively new and quite inefficient, we assume that their
selection was motivated solely by research interest; Amazon’s
researchers are co-authors of both of these proposals.
In these experiments authentication (signatures) has been
seen as a secondary consideration to key exchange (KEMs).
This is a sensible approach while advanced quantum comput-
ers are not available; authentication occurs only in the present
time but a weak key exchange method can be attacked at any
point in the future, compromising session confidentiality. A
practical problem in trialing post-quantum signatures for TLS
is that there is no widespread Certification Authority (CA) or
PKI support for PQC certificates currently available.
II. ENERGY MEASUREMENTS
NIST has adopted ARM Cortex M4 CPU [36] as their
reference platform for lightweight PQC algorithm evaluation.
Cortex M4 uses the ARMv7-m architecture, a somewhat
stripped down version of ARM’s 32-bit ISA (Instruction Set
Architecture). Cortex M4 is licensed by ARM as an IP core
and is often implemented as a single-chip microcontroller
(MCU SoC). Such Cortex M4 - based MCU chips typically
cost less than $10 and are manufactured by NXP, ST Mi-
croelectronics, Microchip/Atmel, and many others. Billions of
units are shipped each year, mainly for consumer electronics,
home appliances, industrial and automotive applications.
The PQM43 project has helped to port many of the PQC
candidate algorithms to the Cortex M4 target platform. Many
of these implementations have target-specific assembly lan-
guage optimizations created by the design teams for this
purpose [37]. We use the same implementations in our bench-
marking but with different testing firmware and platform. For
reference, we also measured conventional NIST-curve ECDH
3PQM4 project, source code, and results: https://github.com/mupq/pqm4
Fig. 1. The Post-Quantum Power Sandwich: The LPM01A “Power Shield”
programmable power supply installed on top of a NUCLEO-F411RE target.
(key agreement) and ECDSA (signature) algorithms. The ECC
implementation used is Ken MacKay’s “micro-ecc”.4
Note that ARM SecurCore SC3005 secure elements are
based on a closely related ARMv6-m (Cortex M3) archi-
tecture. STMicroelectronics alone had shipped more than a
billion SC300-based ST33 units by early 2019. These chips
are widely used as (e)SIMs (Subscriber Identity Modules) and
TPMs (Trusted Platform Modules). Cortex M4 implementa-
tions run on SC300 targets with only minor modifications and
with very similar cycle counts. Cortex M4 performance is,
therefore, a reasonable indicator for expected performance on
real-life SIMs, TPMs, smart cards, and other secure elements
if no PQC-specific cryptography acceleration is implemented.
However additional software side-channel countermeasures are
appropriate on these applications since their attack model
includes physical attacks (PQM4 implementations only have
some countermeasures against timing attacks).
A. PQPS, the Post-Quantum Power Sandwich
STMicroelectronics X-NUCLEO-LPM01A “PowerShield”
[38] was used for our power measurements. PowerShield is
an industry-standard power and energy measurement system
adopted by the Ultra-Low Power (ULP) group of EEMBC6
for their ULPMark, IoTMark, and SecureMark benchmarks.
The target algorithms were run on a NUCLEO-F411RE
development board. This particular STM32F411RE [39] Cor-
tex M4 MCU has a maximum clock frequency of 100 MHz,
128 kBytes of SRAM and 512 kB of Flash memory. We
chose this newer, but more limited board over STM32F407VG
Discovery [40] (used by the PQM4 team) as it supports direct,
external switched-mode power supply to the Vcore pin of the
MCU, allowing power measurements with less interference
4micro-ecc: A small and fast ECDH and ECDSA implementation for 8-bit,
32-bit, and 64-bit processors. https://github.com/kmackay/micro-ecc
5SC300: https://www.arm.com/products/silicon-ip-cpu/securcore/sc300
6EEMBC, the Embedded Microprocessor Benchmark Consortium develops
various embedded system benchmarks: https://www.eembc.org/
from peripherals. Several minor hardware modifications were
necessary; these are documented on the project web site.
The PowerShield measurement board is designed to be
installed on the top of the target board; hence the name “Post-
Quantum Power Sandwich” (PQPS) for this experiment. Fig. 1
shows the system configuration. The PowerShield was running
its default benchmarking firmware, while the target board was
running the firmware that we developed. Python scripts control
both boards simultaneously and collect results on a Ubuntu
Linux 18.04 host.
We adopted most of the PQM4 [37] PQC implementations
to work with our Mbed OS - based test firmware; ARM’s gcc-
based cross compilers and assemblers were used. See Table I
for a list of supported algorithms. We tried to add as many
of the NIST PQC candidate algorithms in our testing suite as
possible and will continue to update it. Many of the excluded
algorithms simply do not fit on the target IoT platform due to
excessive computational or memory requirements. All source
code and scripts used in the PQPS experiment is open source
and available from: https://github.com/mjosaarinen/pqps.
B. Measurement Results
Table II summarizes our results. Some NIST-curve ECDH
and ECDSA measurements are offered as a reference; For PQC
algorithms the table contains the claimed post-quantum secu-
rity level L1 · · · L5 [13], followed by public key (PubKey),
ciphertext (CphTxt) and signature (SigLen) lengths in bytes
and the actual measurements for keypair generation, encapsu-
lation, decapsulation (corresponding to public-key encryption
and decryption), and creating and verifying signatures. Each
measurement consists of timing in millions of clock cycles,
average power in milliwatts, and energy in Joules.
The MCU was clocked at 96MHz during the experiment.
The PowerShield was programmed to regulate the voltage
at 3.00V and integrate energy consumption from dynamic
current (which the device samples with high frequency).
The current varied between 10.6mA and 37.8mA during
acquisition. The on-board temperature sensor reported between
20.0 ◦C and 27.0 ◦C during the experiment, with 78% of
measurements at 26± 1◦C. The temperature stayed within
5 ◦C from each board self-calibration.
Each acquisition was synchronized with the execution of
the target algorithm at microsecond precision by using one of
the interface pins (d7) as a trigger (a feature of PowerShield
firmware). Each measurement ran for 10 000ms (roughly 109
cycles) which is usually sufficient for hundreds of iterations;
average Wattage was derived from this measurement. The
target board itself performed clock cycle counts; the energy
usage of each primitive is derived from these quantities.
We performed at least three full runs of all algorithm
measurements and randomized the order in each run. This
required several days of non-stop automated testing. The
three results (which themselves are averages of thousands of
individual measurements) were verified to have satisfactory
consistency and precision.
For additional implementation metrics such as code size and
stack usage, we refer the reader to the PQM4 project [37] since
we used largely the same implementations.
a) Note on SIKE Measurements and Implementations:
Unlike other agorithms SIKE may require more than 10
seconds for a single operation. The overall energy consump-
tion is extrapolated from the power draw during the first
10 seconds; its instruction mix and power draw seems to
be quite homogeneous during algorithm execution, however.
Faster implementations of SIKE for Cortex M4 in assembly
language are reported in [41], but these implementations have
not been made publicly available for measurement. Reported
cycle counts indicate that these are still about 100 times slower
than lattice-based schemes at the same PQ security level. On
slower CPUs their multi-second latency can severely affect
usability in addition to the energy budget.
C. On PC and Server-side Energy Consumption
We also measured the energy consumption of PQC algo-
rithms on PC-class laptop and desktop targets. This experiment
instrumented the SUPERCOP benchmarking platform with
Intel’s built-in RAPL (Running Average Power Limit) energy
counters and is available under the PQPS repository.7
We profiled 159 variants of 20 NIST PQC algorithms
on typical desktop (i7-8700) and laptop (i5-8250U) systems.
Three different components of each algorithm were measured
separately, bringing the total number to several hundred; the
experiment ran for many days even though the number of
compiler options in SUPERCOP was minimized.
The average energy was 5.4 nJ/cycle on the laptop system
and 8.8 nJ/cycle on the desktop system. The main observation
was that power has relatively little variation depending on the
algorithm in question on these platforms, being concentrated in
a ± 10% range (Fig. 2). These measurements, and the ones re-
ported in [42] indicate that timing (cycle counts without related
power measurements) leads to reasonable energy estimates on
higher-end CPUs where power dissipation is more constant.
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Fig. 2. Running power is much less algorithm-dependent on PC-class chips.
Blue: i7-8700 @ 4.6 GHz (Desktop) Green: i5-8250U @ 3.4 GHz (Laptop)
7 SUPPERCOP: https://github.com/mjosaarinen/pqps/tree/master/suppercop
TABLE II
BANDWIDTH, CPU CYCLE, POWER, AND ENERGY USAGE OF PQC ALGORITHMS ON CORTEX M4 STM32F AT 96 MHZ
Key Establishment PQ Transmit Bytes Keypair Generation Encapsulate Decapsulate
Algorithm / Variant Level PubKey CphTxt 106 clk mW Energy 106 clk mW Energy 106 clk mW Energy
ECDH-secp256k1 none 64 64 4.108 65.41 2.799 mJ 8.215 65.36 5.594 mJ 4.108 65.45 2.801 mJ
ECDH-secp256r1 none 64 64 5.814 60.47 3.663 mJ 11.63 59.99 7.267 mJ 5.815 60.35 3.656 mJ
FrodoKEM-640-AES [L1] 9616 9720 48.38 73.96 37.28 mJ 47.20 71.34 35.08 mJ 46.65 71.04 34.52 mJ
...-640-SHAKE [L1] 9616 9720 80.01 79.03 65.87 mJ 80.00 77.92 64.94 mJ 79.44 77.84 64.42 mJ
Kyber512 [L1] 800 736 0.516 76.88 413.6 µJ 0.654 78.33 534.0 µJ 0.623 78.28 508.8 µJ
Kyber768 [L3] 1184 1088 0.978 75.77 772.3 µJ 1.150 76.80 920.4 µJ 1.100 76.50 876.3 µJ
Kyber1024 [L5] 1568 1568 1.575 77.11 1.265 mJ 1.784 77.61 1.442 mJ 1.714 77.47 1.383 mJ
NewHope512-CCA [L1] 928 1120 0.591 78.52 483.9 µJ 0.922 78.09 750.1 µJ 0.906 77.77 734.0 µJ
NewHope1024-CCA [L5] 1824 2208 1.167 78.91 959.3 µJ 1.785 78.31 1.456 mJ 1.764 78.13 1.436 mJ
NTRU-HPS2048509 [L1] 699 699 78.79 41.94 34.42 mJ 0.634 59.89 395.6 µJ 0.546 84.20 479.6 µJ
NTRU-HPS2048677 [L3] 930 930 141.3 41.18 60.62 mJ 0.943 59.30 582.7 µJ 0.849 83.52 739.0 µJ
NTRU-HRSS701 [L3] 1138 1138 154.2 41.18 66.15 mJ 0.398 79.25 328.8 µJ 0.898 82.91 776.0 µJ
NTRU-HPS4096821 [L5] 1230 1230 212.0 40.90 90.31 mJ 1.189 59.02 731.0 µJ 1.079 84.49 949.6 µJ
R5ND 1KEM 5d [L1] 445 565 0.342 73.76 263.5 µJ 0.544 71.82 407.1 µJ 0.729 69.47 527.9 µJ
R5ND 3KEM 5d [L3] 780 883 0.675 70.20 493.9 µJ 1.015 70.90 749.4 µJ 1.298 69.89 945.3 µJ
R5ND 5KEM 5d [L5] 972 1095 1.229 66.42 850.0 µJ 1.785 66.00 1.227 mJ 2.339 64.47 1.571 mJ
R5N1 1KEM 0d [L1] 5214 5252 5.577 55.63 3.232 mJ 4.487 65.57 3.065 mJ 5.340 65.61 3.650 mJ
R5N1 3KEM 0d [L3] 8834 8890 8.914 54.53 5.063 mJ 7.416 64.56 4.987 mJ 8.445 65.19 5.735 mJ
R5N1 5KEM 0d [L5] 14264 14320 32.82 60.90 20.82 mJ 21.88 59.74 13.62 mJ 25.59 60.37 16.10 mJ
LightSaber [L1] 672 736 0.457 82.50 393.2 µJ 0.651 82.41 559.3 µJ 0.677 83.23 587.8 µJ
Saber [L3] 992 1088 0.899 82.32 771.2 µJ 1.170 82.71 1.008 mJ 1.209 83.44 1.051 mJ
FireSaber [L5] 1312 1472 1.455 81.87 1.241 mJ 1.791 82.20 1.533 mJ 1.854 82.63 1.596 mJ
LAC128 [L1] 544 712 2.275 49.61 1.176 mJ 3.993 49.11 2.043 mJ 6.064 50.58 3.195 mJ
LAC192 [L3] 1056 1188 7.546 49.81 3.916 mJ 10.01 50.53 5.267 mJ 18.53 50.23 9.698 mJ
LAC256 [L5] 1056 1424 7.686 50.94 4.079 mJ 13.56 50.66 7.158 mJ 22.22 50.59 11.71 mJ
BabyBear [L2] 804 917 0.657 71.04 486.7 µJ 0.825 69.60 598.8 µJ 1.276 68.06 904.5 µJ
MamaBear [L4] 1194 1307 1.280 70.58 941.4 µJ 1.501 69.33 1.084 mJ 2.137 68.21 1.518 mJ
PapaBear [L5] 1584 1697 2.126 70.16 1.554 mJ 2.400 69.16 1.729 mJ 3.232 68.28 2.299 mJ
ntrulpr653 [L2] 897 1025 56.57 47.06 27.73 mJ 112.6 47.07 55.24 mJ 168.4 47.09 82.59 mJ
ntrulpr761 [L3] 1039 1167 76.64 47.74 38.12 mJ 152.7 47.87 76.14 mJ 228.3 47.23 112.3 mJ
ntrulpr857 [L4] 1184 1312 97.03 47.13 47.64 mJ 193.3 47.25 95.16 mJ 289.2 47.11 141.9 mJ
sntrup653 [L2] 994 897 600.3 46.38 290.1 mJ 56.68 47.76 28.21 mJ 171.4 46.69 83.34 mJ
sntrup761 [L3] 1158 1039 813.4 46.32 392.5 mJ 76.76 47.32 37.84 mJ 232.4 46.49 112.6 mJ
sntrup857 [L4] 1322 1184 1027 46.69 499.5 mJ 97.16 48.05 48.63 mJ 293.9 46.20 141.4 mJ
SIKEp434 [L1] 330 346 666.0 67.89 471.0 mJ 1091 68.18 774.7 mJ 1163 68.17 826.1 mJ
SIKEp503 [L2] 378 402 1004 68.69 718.8 mJ 1656 68.81 1.187 J 1761 69.01 1.266 J
SIKEp610 [L3] 462 486 1880 68.72 1.346 J 3460 69.11 2.491 J 3480 69.10 2.505 J
SIKEp751 [L5] 564 596 3404 67.76 2.403 J 5521 68.40 3.934 J 5930 68.59 4.237 J
Signature PQ Transmit Bytes Keypair Generation Sign Verify
Algorithm / Variant Level PubKey SigLen 106 clk mW Energy 106 clk mW Energy 106 clk mW Energy
ECDSA-secp256k1 none 64 64 4.109 64.02 2.741 mJ 4.475 64.96 3.028 mJ 4.546 65.00 3.078 mJ
ECDSA-secp256r1 none 64 64 5.814 59.14 3.582 mJ 6.185 59.97 3.864 mJ 6.639 59.88 4.142 mJ
Dilithium2 [L1] 1184 2044 1.328 77.58 1.073 mJ 4.663 77.75 3.777 mJ 1.389 77.49 1.121 mJ
Dilithium3 [L2] 1472 2701 2.172 77.78 1.760 mJ 7.212 76.48 5.746 mJ 2.116 77.37 1.705 mJ
Dilithium4 [L3] 1760 3366 2.930 78.25 2.389 mJ 7.263 77.11 5.834 mJ 2.997 78.02 2.436 mJ
Falcon-512 [L1] 897 690 182.2 62.53 118.7 mJ 39.57 55.91 23.05 mJ 493.5 67.12 345.0 µJ
Falcon-512-tree [L1] 897 690 200.9 62.31 130.4 mJ 18.19 60.18 11.40 mJ 492.4 66.80 342.7 µJ
Falcon-1024 [L5] 1793 1330 380.2 58.72 232.6 mJ 79.36 54.67 45.19 mJ 1.013 65.37 690.0 µJ
III. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
Most microchip technology follows the MOSFET / CMOS
“dynamic power equation” [43] which can be written as
Pdyn = α · C · V 2 · f. (1)
Here Pdyn = Dynamic power, α = activity, C = Capacitive load,
V = Voltage, and f = Frequency. Only the activity variable
α depends on the particular instruction mix being executed.
CPUs, of course, have also static power consumption; ultra-
low power CPUs a lot less (by design) than desktop CPUs.
Since frequency f has a linear relationship with power
(Eqn. 1) and cycle length 1/f with algorithm execution time,
frequency mostly cancels out and has surprisingly little ef-
fect on the energy consumption of individual algorithms at
CPUs “efficiency range”. However at very high frequencies
(flash program) memory or other components may introduce
additional wait states forcing algorithms to use up more clock
cycles for the same task. Higher clock frequencies may also
require higher voltage (voltage scaling); note the V 2 term.
Estimation on other targets can be performed via relative
Wattage, cycles, and a platform scaling parameter that is often
expressed in µA/MHz. Product datasheets often contain vague
or misleading values for this quantity; we recommend careful
calibration with some benchmark algorithm [44].
A. Effect of Key and Ciphertext Lengths
In addition to energy consumed by computation, the length
of public keys, signatures, and ciphertext also affect the energy
consumption via increased radio communication. Significantly
reduced transmission energy and time has traditionally been
seen as the most important advantage of ECC over RSA. We
can use RSA public key and ciphertext (or signature) lengths
as a yardstick for bandwidth requirements.
The bandwidth requirements of the PQC candidate with the
shortest ciphertexts and public keys, Isogeny-based SIKEp434
[34] corresponds to RSA with 2600-bit keys, while the most
efficient lattice-based proposal Round5 (R5ND 1KEM 5d)
[46] corresponds to RSA with 4000-bit keys at the same post-
quantum security level. However, Round5 and other structure
lattice schemes require less than one percent of the computa-
tion time and energy of SIKE.
We observe that the per-bit transmission energy exfer has
dropped from 10µJ/bit during the 2G (EDGE) era to less
than 1.0µJ/bit for mobile device WiFi, HSPA, Bluetooth LE,
ZigBee, and LTE (See Fig. 3) [45], [47]. Currently 0.1µJ/bit
can be expected with LTE or with Bluetooth LE technologies.
Predicted 5G transmission speeds imply exfer in nJ/bit range.
Simple estimation models for total energy can be used to
choose an appropriate algorithm depending on exfer:
EKG + exfer|pubkey| for key generation,
EEnc + exfer|ciphertext| for encapsulation,
ESign + exfer|signature| for authentication.
where EKG, EEnc, and ESign are the energy required for
computation of keypairs, encapsulation, and signatures and
vertical bars indicate data length in bits.
The relevant “energy basket” depends on the particular
protocol and communicating party (Alice or Bob?). We can
also construct generalized “index” energy baskets for the
purpose of comparing algorithms. For example
EKG + EEnc + EDec + exfer(|pubkey|+ |ciphertext|) (2)
estimates the total energy of an ephemeral key exchange; in
this case exfer is the total energy to send (and receive) a bit.
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Fig. 3. Transmission efficiency in the pre-5G era. From Lauridsen et al [45].
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Fig. 4. Energy cross-over from Round5 to SIKE is around > 1 mJ/bit.
B. Transmission Energy Cross-over Points
When other relevant engineering factors are fixed and al-
gorithm selection depends on transmission energy alone, we
may use an energy model or “basket” such as Equation 2 to
determine rough (order of magnitude) cross-over points for
energy-optimal algorithm selection.
Based on our data, the smaller message length of Isogeny-
based PQC justifies its energy consumption over structured
lattices when transmission energy is above the magnitude of
exfer > 1 mJ/bit (Fig. 4), hundreds of times higher than exfer
of common radio interface technologies used today [45].8
We may also determine the cross-over point from structured
lattices to conventional ECC cryptography. Our data indicates
ECDHE to be more energy-efficient when exfer > 1 µJ/bit.
Actual cross-over estimates for Round5 are 1.9/2.7/3.2 µJ/bit
for 256/384/512-bit EC curves (equivalent to 128/192/256-bit
or L1/L3/L5 classical security – but no PQ security).
IV. CONCLUSIONS
We find that post-quantum transition can imply energy
savings over current ECC cryptography even with current radio
technologies, and increasingly more with 5G’s transmission
speeds. Some existing ECC use cases will remain that can’t
readily support longer messages of any of the PQC alternatives
(or RSA) but for TLS it is not a problem. Furthermore, there
is a huge scale in PQC energy requirements (Fig. 5).
Adam Langley (Google) concludes observations from
Google / Cloudflare post-quantum cloud experiment [31] as
. . . Thus the overall conclusion of these experiments
is that post-quantum confidentiality in TLS should
probably be based on structured lattices . . .
Our IoT experiments support this view. Here “structured
lattices” refers to cryptosystems based on NTRU, RLWE, and
related problems. The comparison was made against Isogeny-
based PQC cryptography (SIKE) in particular.
8Transmission energy of exfer > 1 mJ/bit implies either continuous RF
transmission power of several Watts (requiring a radio license) or data rate
of just hundreds of bits per second. Battery life is low if there is any kind of
data payload; 5 megabytes will completely drain a 40 kJ smartphone battery.
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Fig. 5. The average power of the Cortex M4 target (STM32F411RE at 96 MHz) varies significantly depending on the algorithm – from 40 mW to 85 mW
– but computation time has a scale of four orders of magnitude. All security levels of the same algorithm usually fit into the same cluster since the time axis
is logarithmic. Note how some algorithms such as NTRU and Falcon have significantly more complex key generation than other operations.
Kyber, NewHope, Round5, and Saber have lightweight
variants where all three primitive operations < 1mJ and public
key size and ciphertext expansion is bound by approximately
one kilobyte (NewHope slightly more). Additionally LAC and
ThreeBears are very close and are faster than ECC. NTRU
(HRSS) has a computationally expensive keypair generation
which limits its usability in the ephemeral (forward secure)
TLS use case. The NTRU Prime variant is much slower than
NTRU; not all “structured lattice” algorithms are equivalent.
The Dilithium and Falcon lattice-based signature algorithms
are suitable for mobile devices and PKI as also noted in [48].
Falcon has smaller public keys, signatures, and faster signature
verification so it would be preferred for client-side applications
(i.e. when the mobile device verifies server certificates but does
not sign). The signature performance of Falcon suffers from
a lack of a double-precision floating point unit on our test
platform, however, so Dilithium may be preferable when both
parties are expected to use certificate-based authentication.
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